Armenia elections: will Russia-Armenia relations remain tense?

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan won parliamentary elections despite Russian pressure, but relations with Moscow remain complex. Pro-Russian parties achieved their best result since 2018, and Pashinyan promised to visit Putin after the elections. Armenia's turn toward the West appears irreversible, but most Armenians do not wish to sever ties with Russia entirely.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan won parliamentary elections held in June 2026, despite an intense pressure campaign from Russia. The country made a clear choice toward the West, but the future of relations between Moscow and Yerevan remains uncertain.

Russian pressure before the elections

Russia's pre-election pressure campaign served two purposes. First, Moscow sought to intimidate voters through various Armenian import restrictions, hoping they would feel the negative consequences of losing the Russian market. The restrictions primarily hit agricultural goods, which were meant to influence voters in provincial regions, where Pashinyan's support is stronger than in the capital. In Yerevan, the prime minister's party garnered just over 40% of votes, while in the regions it nearly reached 60%.

Second, Russia sought in the longer term to influence Pashinyan himself, threatening to denounce the gas agreement if Armenia continues its European integration and demanding that a referendum on joining the European Union be held. The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) member states presented this demand collectively to make it appear that Moscow's concern was economic rather than political.

The actual impact of restrictions was limited

Despite the noise of threats, the restrictions actually imposed remained modest. All prohibited commodity groups account for only a few percent of Armenia's exports. Moreover, the EU responded swiftly: it offered to provide Yerevan with financial aid and temporarily waived tariffs on Armenian fruits and vegetables. Several European countries announced solidarity, offering their markets to Armenian goods, which made Moscow's threats look weak by comparison.

Notably, Russia itself derives considerable benefit from economic cooperation with Armenia. Since 2022, Armenia has become a transit country for goods subject to Western sanctions. Armenian exports to Russia grew from $840 million in 2021 to nearly $3 billion by the end of 2025, with growth driven primarily by re-exports of Western goods. For example, Armenia sent nearly $1 billion in electronics to Russia in 2025, compared to $12 million in 2021.

Yerevan has its own leverage

Armenia too has its own pressure tools. Pashinyan has alluded to the possibility of withdrawing from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), from which Armenia has already derived only nominal benefits, as Russia has essentially ceased arms sales to Armenia years ago. Under greater pressure, Yerevan also drew closer to Turkey, which increasingly competes with Russia for influence in the South Caucasus.

Still, Pashinyan himself understands the need to ease tensions with Russia. Even before the elections, he announced that he would travel to Moscow after his re-election: "We will meet and settle all outstanding issues." After the elections, he also sent Vladimir Putin a greeting on Russia Day.

Parliament's new balance of power

The election results significantly altered the balance of forces in Armenia's parliament. Pro-Russian opposition parties achieved their best result since 2018. Pashinyan's party no longer has a constitutional majority, meaning that without opposition votes the government cannot hold a referendum on constitutional amendments.

This is particularly important in the context of the peace agreement with Azerbaijan: Baku demands that Armenia's constitution be amended to remove the reference to the independence declaration from its preamble, which was based on the decision on the reunification of the Armenian SSR and Nagorno-Karabakh. If Baku's demands stand, Pashinyan will need to negotiate with the pro-Russian opposition, which is under strong Russian influence.

Future prospects

Armenia's Western-oriented course appears irreversible. According to an International Republican Institute poll from May, 75% of Armenians support European integration. However, most of them believe that Yerevan should not develop relations with Brussels at the expense of partnership with Russia, which makes easing tensions attractive to both sides.

The Kremlin appears ready to receive Pashinyan. The Russian president views him more as a problematic partner than an enemy. In 2025, the two leaders met in person twice, and in 2026 once already. The future thus promises to maintain a tense but functioning balance.