Over 1,300 Russia-Ukraine war veterans now hold government posts in Russia

Investigative outlet Meduza has identified at least 1,305 participants in Russia's war against Ukraine who have obtained government positions or mandates since the invasion began. While the Kremlin promotes veterans as a "new elite," data shows the career elevator primarily benefits those who already had ties to state structures. The process is accelerating sharply, and upcoming September 2026 elections are set to bring even more war participants into power.

Russia's government positions are being steadily filled with veterans of the war against Ukraine, according to a major investigative database published by Meduza in June 2026. The outlet identified at least 1,305 war participants who have obtained state posts, elected mandates, or quasi-governmental roles since Russia launched its full-scale invasion, occupying a combined 1,311 positions.

Scale and acceleration

The recruitment of war veterans into state structures began accelerating significantly from early 2024, when Vladimir Putin launched the "Time of Heroes" personnel programme. Meduza's data shows the pace has been remarkable: just 45 such appointments were recorded in 2023, rising to at least 201 in 2024, then surging to at least 754 in 2025. In the first five months of 2026 alone, at least 311 more were recorded.

Putin has repeatedly declared that war participants constitute Russia's "new elite," promising that the state will continue to rely on those who "returned from the special military operation" to form a new "management corps." Meduza's investigation set out to test whether that rhetoric matches reality.

Who is actually getting the jobs?

The findings complicate the Kremlin's narrative significantly. Of the 1,305 people identified, at least 848 had professional backgrounds resembling civil service before their deployment, including 447 with prior state or municipal employment experience, 303 with professional military backgrounds, and 98 from law enforcement agencies.

«The war has become a career elevator, but primarily for those who already held power,» Meduza concludes, noting that ordinary soldiers remain a visible minority among those entering state structures.

This is quietly acknowledged even within the Russian system. Sergei Novikov, head of the Presidential Administration's Department for Public Projects, said in late 2025 that "tens of thousands" of war veterans were unemployed, with early state media reports citing a figure of around 250,000 jobless veterans before those reports were quietly edited. A veteran from the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug complained directly to Putin in May 2025 that he could not find work despite official promises, telling journalists that real appointments go to "the right people."

Regional distribution and key appointments

Appointments are unevenly distributed across Russia. Moscow Oblast leads with 76 cases, followed by Bashkortostan (41), Tatarstan (37), occupied Crimea and Sevastopol (30 combined), Samara Oblast (30), Yakutia (29), and Novosibirsk Oblast (28).

The most prominent individual case is Yevgeny Pervyshov, who became governor of Tambov Oblast, the first war veteran to head a Russian region, after serving in the elite BARS "Kaskad" volunteer unit. His appointment came through the "Time of Heroes" programme. A second governor-level case is Alexander Shuvaev, appointed acting governor of Belgorod Oblast.

The mechanics of appointment

Meduza identified three main pathways into power. The first is through federal and regional veteran training programmes like "Time of Heroes," which channelled at least 446 people into positions. The second is participation in elections, primarily at municipal and regional levels, largely symbolic posts offering public status but little real influence. The third is acceleration of existing careers: war service acts as a booster rather than a launchpad.

A source close to the Presidential Administration told Meduza that the most practical career track for returning veterans in the executive branch runs through youth work, patriotic education, and veteran liaison roles. «It sounds solid, department head, deputy minister, or even a full minister. But you won't be able to make costly mistakes through inexperience,» one senior regional official said.

"Deputy battalions" and fictitious service

A significant portion of the data involves officials who served in BARS volunteer units, formations that critics and pro-war military bloggers themselves describe as "deputy battalions" or "laundromats" where officials and politicians formally participate in the war without approaching the front line. Meduza found at least 113 serving officials who served in BARS units; 22 received new posts afterward, while 91 returned to their old positions.

War service has also emerged as a tool for avoiding criminal prosecution. Russia's Prosecutor General Alexander Gutsan reported in March 2026 that at least 1,100 individuals convicted on corruption charges were serving in the war zone.

What comes next

The trend is set to intensify. Meduza identified 1,326 individuals who declared participation in elections or went through party primaries as war veterans. United Russia's party congress on 28 June 2026 confirmed 90 war veteran candidates for the upcoming State Duma elections scheduled for September 2026.

One veteran, Vladislav Golovin, head of the pro-government Yunarmia youth movement, secured a place in the top five of United Russia's federal list, alongside Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, children's ombudsman Maria Lvova-Belova, and military journalist Yevgeny Poddubny.

"We need to show the president the new elite," a political consultant working with the Presidential Administration's political bloc told Meduza. "And make sure it comes without PTSD."